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“neo-romans” did not embrace the vita activa; they conceived of liberty as nondomination, and virtue as the qualities of character needed to sustain a free state.
Nelson follows Skinner’s lead and makes the next move.
If Machiavelli and his followers were neo-roman, and if
Greek and Roman traditions diverge, then it ought to be
possible to identify a separate Greek tradition. And so it
is. For neo-romans, freedom is nondomination; for Greeks
it is living according to nature. For neo-romans, the highest end of life is glory; for Greeks it is happiness. For
neo-romans, virtue requires civic participation; for Greeks
it culminates in contemplation. For neo-romans, justice
entails the protection of private property; for Greeks, property is a communal resource that ought to be distributed
“in such a way as to advance some normative vision of
human nature” (p. 17).
The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought unfolds in
six chapters devoted to key figures and pivotal moments.
More’s Utopians, following Plato, “take it as axiomatic
that justice requires the rule of the better over the baser”
(p. 42). Because private property indelibly corrupts the
souls of men, and because its effects cannot be regulated,
it must be eliminated. Few embraced More’s communism, but all who came after him in the Greek tradition
held that “the central challenge confronting political theory”
was the task of mitigating the effects of wealth (p. 48).
James Harrington “makes clear from the very outset that
Oceana is a book about greed” (p. 88). Montesquieu urges
that “the chief agent responsible for promoting the passions at the expense of justice turns out to be wealth”
(p. 155). By the American Revolution, Greek ideas had
transmuted into a “vibrant” set of claims regarding the
efficacy of agrarian laws and the importance of regulating
inheritance (p. 199). The denouement of the Greek tradition did not come until the nineteenth century, in the
writings of de Tocqueville.
Nelson writes with verve and erudition. Each chapter is
based on a comprehensive study of primary and secondary sources. The book is intentionally provocative; almost
every page presents familiar texts in a new and challenging
light. Specialists will find plenty to argue with. Is it true
that Harrington embraced the Platonic view that virtue
was “the result of a justly balanced soul aligned with the
cosmos through contemplation” (p. 125)? Or that Montesquieu took Plato as “an authoritative political guide”
(p. 170)? The sheer quality of Nelson’s arguments and
evidence will make these and similar engagements fruitful
and rewarding.
Three worries. First, are the ideas Nelson isolates sufficiently distinct and coherent to constitute a tradition, and
if so, do they capture all that was significant about the
early-modern reception of Greek political ideas? Hobbes
famously complained that it was by reading “Aristotle,
Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans,” that men
had “gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of

favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions
of their Sovereigns.” What should we make of this claim?
Second, in what sense are these ideas republican? Pocock’s
republicans articulated a positive conception of liberty.
Skinner’s neo-romans argued that individual liberty was
possible only in a free state. Nelson’s Greeks seem unconcerned with questions of participation or representation.
They “advocated the redistribution of wealth so that they
could institute and preserve a particular structure of rulership: a structure in which a few elect, virtuous men rule,
and all the rest are ruled” (p. 233). Can the concept of
republicanism be stretched to include the Greek tradition,
yet retain sufficient precision to do explanatory or analytic
work?
Finally, how should we assess these ideas? Were theorists in the Greek tradition astute observers of their world?
Were they ever confused or opaque? Did contemporaries
find their arguments compelling, meretricious, or beside
the point? How did they weigh and balance the claims of
Greek theorists against alternative accounts of greed or
economic inequality? How did the emergence of commercial economies in the late seventeenth century affect the
plausibility of Greek ideas? The Greek Tradition does not
attempt to answer these questions. It does, however, bring
them to the fore, and in so doing helps focus our attention
on the complex dynamics of wealth and virtue in earlymodern political thought.
Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations. Edited by Beate
Rössler. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 231p. $55.00 cloth,
$22.95 paper.
— Linda C. McClain, Hofstra University

This fine collection of essays on privacy crosses disciplinary and national boundaries, bringing together 13 scholars from law, philosophy, political theory, and film studies
to consider “various aspects of the problematic of the private.” As the editor, Beate Rössler, explains this “problematic,” current debates about the value and limits of
privacy—such as the reach of information technology or
the private lives of public figures—pose afresh more fundamental philosophical questions about privacy: What is
the normative grounding for a right to privacy? How does
such a right relate to identity and integrity? What is the
demarcation in persons’ lives between the private and the
public? And why should privacy be valued?
The collection approaches these questions by presenting “dialogical pairs” of essays on common topics, in which
the second takes the first as its starting point. Just as the
definitions of privacy are multiple, so too are the approaches
taken by the scholars in this volume concerning how best
to frame critical questions about privacy. Rössler provides
a helpful overview of these questions. The essays are short
and accessible, yet take the reader through a refreshing
diversity of topics and locations. A strength of the book is
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the way each author situates discussion of privacy in a
particular context. Thus, principal authors and their commentators ponder “the problematic of the private” as it
bears on sexual harassment in the workplace ( Jean Cohen
and Maeve Cooke), autobiographies by Western philosophers and an indigenous Australian woman (Moira Gatens and Wendy Brown), the dynamic of justice and
affection in modern families (Axel Honneth and Herlinde
Pauer-Studer), the need of the elderly for a personal space
of their own (Iris Marion Young and Krishan Kumar),
and the risks posed to privacy and identity by information
technologies ( Jeffrey Reiman and Gertrud Koch).
The contributors recognize that norms specific to particular legal and political cultures shape answers about the
definition and value of privacy. Anita Allen notes the puzzle that the United States is “extraordinary” in the prevalence of its privacy regulation, as compared to similar
Western nations, and yet does not have enough privacy
law (for example, inadequate protection of same-sex intimate association and of consumer’s transactions on the
Internet). Nicola Lacey argues that in some legal systems
(such of England’s), concern for privacy has to be read
“between the lines,” but also illustrates how local circumstances (for example, public reaction against intrusive
paparazzi), as well as international human rights norms,
may inspire a more explicit embrace of privacy.
Many lively debates run through the volume. Here I
will note just one. How inviolate must the domain of
privacy be to foster such goods as ethical competence,
agency, freedom, and a creative, critical self ? Reiman
explains the value of privacy by reference to a private space
within the self—an inner personal core to which one can
retreat and engage in criticism of convention, be creative,
rebel, and find renewal. Cohen links privacy to ethical
competence: being free to make, for oneself, intimate decisions. Young depicts the home as a crucial space for forming and protecting identity, precisely because of the capacity
to control access to it and shape it in one’s own image. By
contrast, Cooke counters that to construct identity, the
self needs rational accountability. Persons must come out
of their private space to be challenged by others to evaluate their view of the good life. Kumar, similarly, contends
that the retreat to the home may signal a significant loss of
the opportunity for experience, moral learning, and public life.
One limitation of Privacies is that the authors (particularly the commentators) must encapsulate theories of privacy they elaborate in other work (endnotes readily direct
the reader to such work). And even some of the principal
essays leave questions unanswered. Thus, Rössler’s own
substantive contribution to the volume revisits familiar
feminist critiques of liberal accounts of privacy to clear
the path for a feminist, egalitarian conception of privacy
that would build upon John Rawls’s idea of the equal
value of liberty. Jean Cohen addresses the paradox that
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both regulation and nonregulation of intimacy pose harms,
respectively, to autonomy and equality, arguing that the
paradox derives from an anachronistic paradigm of law.
She offers a third paradigm, a “reflexive/procedural” legal
paradigm, and suggests what this new paradigm portends
for the law of sexual harassment. This paradigm relates to
fostering self-regulation within social institutions—“the
application of procedures (procedural norms and principles of fairness) to procedures of conflict resolution (reflexivity)” (pp. 88–89). Cohen contends that sexual harassment
law is reflexive to a point, using incentives, procedures,
norms, and principles to spur self-regulation, but that it
leads to repressive and intrusive regulations and to arbitrariness and underenforcement. I would have liked to
have Cohen’s analysis of whether the Supreme Court’s several opinions on employer procedures and affirmative
defenses have taken the law closer to or farther from the
paradigm she advocates and the goals of fostering “learning, voice, communication, and cooperation solutions”
(p. 92).
Other essays appeal to a “reflexive” paradigm, intimating—without elaborating—its import. Discussing the
interplay of justice and affection within families, Honneth contends that it is only in “discursive exchange”
that family members can explore for themselves whether
and how to translate universal principles of justice into
the domain of family relations. Pauer-Studer aptly observes
that to leave the question of the proper balance of affection and justice within the family solely to families to
decide for themselves surely goes too far: Justice is both a
private and public virtue. When the public virtue of justice is at stake, government may aim to foster principles
of justice in the family.
Nonetheless, the disadvantage of being left wishing for
more elaboration in these pages is amply balanced by the
advantage of having ready access, in one place, to such a
rich and stimulating array of perspectives.
Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of
Time. By William Scheuerman. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004. 312p. $42.00.
— Kam Shapiro, Illinois State University

While the political ramifications of social acceleration have
preoccupied thinkers in a variety of disciplines at least
since the Industrial Revolution, and contemporary works
by such thinkers as Paul Virilio, David Harvey, James Der
Derian, and William Connolly have highlighted various
modes of speed, many in political science have been slow
to pay heed. William Scheuerman’s book aims to redress
this lag in the discipline, taking up the theme of social
acceleration from these and other authors and using it to
frame a wide-ranging assessment of transformations to
liberal democratic legal and political institutions.

